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Abstract. Although decision makers use dimensional processing strategies when choosing between 
simultaneously presented and multidimensionally described alternatives, Tversky (1969) has conjectured that 
alternative based processing would occur when the same alternatives are presented one after the other. This 
hypothesis was elaborated upon with effort—quality considerations. The first experiment which was a 
replication of a previous study only partially supported the above hypothesis. As predicted, longer latencies 
indicated more judgment based processing for the sequential presentation than for the simultaneous 
presentation. However, memory measures did not indicate any differences. Think aloud protocols of a 
second experiment revealed that for sequentially presented alternatives dimensional comparisons are applied 
in addition to judgment based processing. The application of the two processing components can be 
described by a Markov model which specifies a hybrid decision strategy. 
In his 1969 paper, Tversky demonstrated that decision makers use dimensional processing 
strni i^ ies when choosing between multidimensional alternatives. Although the choice 
alternatives were simultaneously presented in Tversky's experiments, he conjectured that 
alternative based processing would occur for the same alternatives when they are presented 
one after the other. 
Tversky's conjecture is intuitively appealing. For example, when shopping for a product, 
the products which are offered by one store are simultaneously available and can thus be 
processed by dimensional strategies. The products of different stores must be inspected in 
sequence, and therefore it is quite likely that alternative based processing occurs. 
While Tversky elaborated upon dimensional processing strategies in considerable detail, he 
referred quite generally to the additive model with respect to alternative based processing. 
The additive model, however, does not capture the underlying cognitive processes, i.e., the 
procedural character of judgment formation (Lopes, 1982). Cognitive choice processes for 
choosing between two alternatives when they are sequentially or simultaneously presented 
to a subject were described by Schmalhofer and Gertzen (1986). Their description was 
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based upon the framework of criterion dependent choice models, whose empirical validity 
has been shown in several studies. Aschenbrenner, Albert and Schmalhofer (1984) have 
shown that such models can account for the information processing of dimensionally 
described and simultaneously presented choice alternatives: The models not only predicted 
choices better than the additive model, there was also a positive relation between choice 
latencies and the number of processing steps predicted by the models. Using a 
process — tracing method, Schmalhofer, Albeit, Aschenbrenner and Gertzen (1986) have 
shown that the criterion dependent choice models adequately describe the decision maker's 
selective and adaptive information utilization. 
Since the current research builds upon these models, we will first describe the generic 
criterion dependent choice model as well as the two specific models for dimensional and 
alternative based processing. Next, we will present an experiment which replicated a 
previous investigation in order to test the stability of the results of that experiment. As a 
second experiment, a think aloud study will be reported. The verbal protocols will be used 
for a detailed exploratory analysis of the information processes for sequentially presented 
alternatives revealing a hybrid decision strategy which can be described as a Markov 
model. 
Criterion dependent choice models 
The basic assumption of criterion dependent choice models is that the information 
processing of an alternative or choice pair continues until some evidence criterion is 
surpassed. This evidence criterion is specified by a number k, which is the only free 
parameter in a criterion dependent model. Thus, decision making is assumed to be a 
selective sequential process. The criterion dependent choice models postulate that the 
availability (and importance) of the choice alternatives' features determines both which 
features will be processed and the order in which they will be processed. The processing 
of a feature yields an attractiveness value for that feature. For attractive and unattractive 
features, positive or negative attractiveness values are obtained, respectively. The 
attractiveness values are combined according to some rule. This rule may specify 
dimensional comparisons or the formation of overall judgments as component processes of 
choices. 
Dimensional comparisons as component processes. It is assumed that at the beginning of 
the choice process neither alternative is favored. Therefore, at the beginning the evidence 
value is assumed to be zero. In the first processing step, the features on the most 
important dimension are evaluated, and the difference of the two attractiveness values is 
calculated. This calculated value represents the evidence value after the processing of the 
first dimension. Then the second most important dimension is processed. After the 
processing of the second dimension, the evidence value is updated by adding the 
attractiveness difference determined for the second dimension. This process continues until 
all dimensions have been processed or one of two criteria is surpassed, i.e., the evidence 
value is larger than k or the evidence value is smaller than — k. A positive evidence value 
determines the choice of one alternative, and a negative evidence value determines the 
choice of the other alternative. For a more detailed description see Albert, Aschenbrenner 
and Schmalhofer (in press). 
This dimension based processing strategy may be difficult to apply for sequentially 
presented alternatives, because the features of the first alternative would have to be stored 
in memory until the next alternative becomes available. To decrease the demands upon 
working memory, subjects could however use judgment as a component decision process in 
this case. Thus, subjects would make an overall judgment of the first alternative and store 
it in memory rather than a list of its features. A second overall judgment is then made for 
the second alternative, and the decision would be based upon a comparison between the 
two overall judgments. For such a strategy, the criterion dependent processing occurs for 
the formation of the judgments of the two choice alternatives. 
Judgments as component processes. The present conception about the formation of 
judgments assumes that the feature evaluations, which may be positive or negative, are 
summed up. In particular, it is assumed that at the beginning of the judgment process the 
evidence value for an alternative is zero, i.e., there is no bias toward a positive or negative 
judgment. In the first processing step, the feature of the most important dimension is 
evaluated and represents the evidence value after the processing of the first dimension. 
Then the second most important dimension is processed. After the processing of the second 
dimension, the evidence value is updated by adding the new attractiveness value. This 
process continues until one of two criteria is surpassed or all features have been processed. 
If the boundary k is surpassed the alternative is considered to be attractive. If the boundary 
— k is surpassed the alternative is unattractive. A judgment about the choice alternative is 
obtained by dividing the evidence value, i.e., the sum of the attractiveness values, by the 
number of processed features. A judgment of the second alternative presented is derived in 
the same way. The alternative which received the better judgment will be chosen. 
Effort—Quality Relations 
In order to assess the advantages of applying dimension versus judgment based processing, 
Schmalhofer and Gertzen (1986) performed an effort — quality analysis for the two choice 
situations of simultaneous or sequential presentation of the alternatives. This analysis was 
based upon the two described versions of the criterion dependent choice models. For the 
two strategies, the effort and quality of a choice have been analyzed under the conditions 
of simultaneous or sequential presentation of the choice alternatives. 
These effort — quality analyses showed that dimension based processing requires less 
computational effort, but that because of memory load, judgment based processing should 
be more economical for sequentially available alternatives. Since judgment based processing 
requires more accumulation operations than dimensional processing and these accumulations 
are probably more difficult and therefore more time consuming than dimensional 
comparisons (Klayman, 1982; Russo & Dosher, 1983), longer choice latencies should be 
observed for sequentially presented alternatives than for simultaneously presented 
alternatives. Furthermore, an experimental investigation of Tversky's hypothesis indicated 
that for sequentially presented choice alternatives decision makers are more likely to apply 
judgment based processing, but not necessarily to the complete exclusion of any dimension 
based processing. In particular, overall judgments obtained from the subjects after their 
choices were in moderately better agreement with the observed choices for sequentially 
presented alternatives than for simultaneously presented alternatives. In addition, choices 
between sequentially available alternatives, which supposedly require more computational 
effort due to judgment based processing, actually required more time than choices between 
simultaneously available alternatives. While these results are consistent with the 
effort — quality analysis, they also showed that the specific criterion dependent choice 
models may be too simple to account for the experimental findings in any detail. 
In the present research we will further examine the stability of the reported findings by an 
experiment with only two minor modifications to the previously used experimental 
procedure. Also, a larger number of subjects will be employed in this study. 
Experiment 1 
The same experimental setup and materials as in Schmalhofer and Gertzen were used. 
Several pairs of multidimensional descriptions of word processors served as choice 
alternatives. There were three between — subjects conditions in the experiment: The two 
alternatives of a choice pair could be presented either (1) simultaneously, (2) sequentially, 
i.e., one after the other, or (3) one after the other with an interfering task in between. 
Method 
Subjects. Fifty —four students of the University of Heidelberg who were paid 10 German 
marks per hour for their participation in the experiment served as subjects. 
Apparatus. The experiment was run under the control of Apple II computers. Learning 
materials and choice alternatives were presented on the video screen of the computer. A 
button box with two response buttons and a lever which could be moved in two dimensions 
was used for collecting the subjects* responses. 
Materials. Eight fictitious word processors, which were described by their features on eight 
dimensions, served as choice alternatives. For every description of an alternative, a 
meaningless name (cvc — trigram) was introduced. A sample choice pair with the respective 
meaningless names is shown in Table 1. 
Table 1: English translation of a sample pair of word processors 
Dimensions Alternatives 
TAF BID 
Correction f a c i l i t i e s 
Graphics f a c i l i t i e s 
Accessibility 
R e l i a b i l i t y 
User friendliness 
Learnability 
Maintenance costs 
Printing speed 
optimal 
moderate 
poor 
quite poor 
good 
optimal 
good 
quite good 
quite poor 
optimal 
medium 
very good 
quite good 
moderate 
very good 
medium 
In order to familiarize the subjects with the relevant dimensions, a text was constructed 
which explained the eight dimensions and the range of possible features of the word 
processors. In this text, the features on each dimension (e.g., printing speed 80 characters 
per second) were specified together with their respective evaluation (e.g., "quite good"). 
Furthermore, the text described an importance ranking of the eight dimensions which was 
obtained in a prior study in which 32 subjects ranked the eight dimensions by their 
importance. Since the dimensions were displayed in decreasing order of importance from 
top to bottom, the importance ranking can be seen in Table 1. 
Procedure. The experiment consisted of four major segments: a study task, decision tasks, 
memory tasks, and rating tasks. Each of these segments began with instructions which 
were displayed on the video screen. Every subject first acquired knowledge by studying the 
explanatory text about word processors, thus making all subjects about equally 
knowledgeable about word processors. A subject was then randomly assigned to one of the 
three experimental conditions. 
The three conditions differed in how the multidimensional descriptions of the alternatives 
were presented: simultaneously, sequentially, or sequentially with an interpolated task to be 
performed between the presentations of the two alternatives. The interpolated task involved 
remembering a 5 —digit number for 30 seconds. In the simultaneous and sequential 
conditions, the interpolated task was performed after a choice pair. In the third condition 
the interpolated task was presented between the alternatives of a choice pair. In order to 
reduce the number of times an alternative had to be presented in a complete paired 
comparison, the eight alternatives were divided into two sets of four alternatives each. For 
both sets, a complete paired comparison was performed. Since every alternative of a pair 
was presented in the first as well as in the second position, every choice pair had to be 
presented twice, yielding a total of 24 choices per subject. 
Under simultaneous presentation both alternatives remained on the screen for 40 seconds. 
After 20 seconds a signal appeared at the bottom of the screen indicating that a choice 
could be made at any time from then on by pressing either the right or the left button. The 
subjects' attention was directed to the alternatives' names in the following way: The 
position of the dimensional description of the alternative on the left or right side of the 
screen was not necessarily identical to the position of the name of the alternative displayed 
at the bottom of the screen to indicate the respective choice button. In order to press the 
button associated with their preferred alternative, the subjects thus had to pay attention to 
the name of an alternative and could not rely on spatial position. This is one of the two 
differences to the previously reported experiment. 
In the other two conditions (i.e., sequential presentation with or without the interpolated 
task between the alternatives of a pair) each alternative remained visible for 20 seconds. In 
these two conditions a choice could be made as soon as the second alternative was 
presented. Thus, in all three conditions the alternatives could be inspected for 40 seconds 
and a choice could be made after 20 seconds of inspection. 
The second modification to the previous experiment was that the dimensions were always 
displayed in the order of their importance, i.e., they were not presented in a new random 
order for each trial. 
Choices and choice latencies were collected. The latency timer was started 20 seconds after 
the onset of the two alternatives (simultaneous presentation) or concurrently with the onset 
of the second alternative (sequential presentation). It was stopped by the subject's button 
press. 
After the decision tasks, subjects judged the attractiveness of the alternatives from memory 
as well as from multidimensional descriptions. In the memory judgment task, subjects were 
only presented with the name of the alternative. In the (regular) judgment task, the 
respective multidimensional descriptions were shown to the subjects without the 
alternative's name (cvc —trigram). The memory judgment task, which was separated from 
the (regular) judgment task by an interfering activity of about 30 minutes duration, 
indicates the judgments about the alternatives which are stored in the decision maker's 
memory after several choices. The regular judgments were collected to compare them to 
the memory judgments. The judgments were obtained by having the subjects move a lever 
so that the cursor was moved to a respective judgment category on a 9 —point rating scale. 
As soon as the desired category was reached, the subject pressed a button. In both 
judgment tasks the categories ranged from poor ( — 4) to optimal (4-4). 
Results 
If subjects indeed used an overall judgment as an intermediate result of the decision 
process rather than dimensional comparisons to derive a choice, these judgments should 
have become incidentally stored in memory. In this case, the collected memory judgments 
should be suitable for predicting a decision maker's choice. To derive such predictions it 
was assumed that the alternative with a higher memory judgment would be chosen. The 
results are given in Table 2. 
Table 2: Relative frequency of correct choice predictions by judgments from memory, 
and correlations between judgments from memory and regular judgments 
Presentation of alternatives 
Simultaneous Sequential With interpolated task 
Predictions .71 .63 .69 
Correlations .25 .23 .36 
A l l predictions significantly differ from chance. However, there is no difference between 
conditions (Chi —square (2,n = 877) = 2.26, p > .25). The same applies for the 
correlations. 
It can be seen from Table 3 that choices between sequentially presented alternatives 
required more time than choices between simultaneously presented alternatives, F(2,51) = 
8.32, p < .001. In this analysis homogeneity of variance was achieved by a 
log — transformation of the latencies. 
Table 3: Average choice latencies and standard deviations (in parentheses) for the three 
experimental conditions 
Presentation of alternatives 
Simultaneous Sequential With interpolated task 
7.77 (6.89) 11.76 (4.03) 11.46 (5.58) 
Discussion 
The longer choice latencies for both sequential conditions were consistent with expectations. 
Presumably, the longer latencies are due to the higher computational effort of judgment 
based processing as compared to dimension based processing of the simultaneously 
presented alternatives. Whereas the previous research has found the predicted differences in 
memories for overall judgments to be significant but small, no effect was obtained in this 
study. The lack of this effect was due to the simultaneous presentation condition in which 
memory judgments were more predictive than in the previous experiment. 
The difference in the results of the two studies may be caused by the subjects' attention 
being more strongly directed to the alternatives' names in the present experiment. The 
predicted differences in processing time are more robust than the differences in memories. 
Tversky*s hypothesis received only partial support. In order to find the reasons why 
subjects did not remember more overall judgments of the sequentially presented 
alternatives, and to explore the processing components in more detail, a think aloud study 
was conducted. It could be that for sequentially presented alternatives judgment and 
dimensional comparison components are both used and form a hybrid strategy. 
Experiment 2 
Subjects were instructed to verbalize their thoughts while choosing one of two 
multidimensionally described word processors which were sequentially presented. 
Method 
Subjects. Three students of the University of Heidelberg who were paid 10 German marks 
per hour participated in the experiment. 
Materials. Similar choice alternatives were used as in the first experiment. Nine word 
processors were described on 12 dimensions. The names of the dimensions were always 
visible to the subject. The features of each alternative were printed on a card and could be 
placed side by side to the respective dimensions. In contrast to Experiment 1, the features 
(e.g., printing speed 80 characters per second) rather than the values of the features (e.g., 
"quite good") were presented. The order in which the dimensions were presented was 
random and remained constant across trials and subjects. 
Procedure. Subjects received an oral instruction followed by a text which explained the 
significance of the 12 dimensions and respective features. Subjects then rank—ordered the 
dimensions by their importance. Initial practice trials were used to familiarize the subjects 
with choice materials and procedure. After a standard think aloud instruction (Ericsson & 
Simon, 1984) and two more choice trials with the think aloud procedure, the nine 
alternatives were administered in a complete paired comparison. Think aloud data were 
collected for a block of 20 pairs who were randomly selected out of the 36 pairs. This 
block of 20 pairs was presented twice with an exchanged order of alternatives within pairs. 
Thus, think aloud data of 40 choice trials were tape — recorded for each subject. In each 
trial the experimenter placed the first alternative in front of the subject and removed it as 
soon as the subject requested the second alternative. A choice trial was ended by the 
subject's choice which was recorded by the experimenter. A session lasted about three 
hours. 
Results 
The transcribed protocols were scored according to the categories employed by 
Schmalhofer and Schafer (1986). In the present study the following categories were 
sufficient for classifying all verbalizations: 
— verbalization of a single feature (VSF), e.g., "30 pages storage capacity is quite good" 
or "it is always accessible at home"; 
— verbalization of a dimensional comparison (VDC), e.g., "printing speed of this one is 
very much slower" or "I just notice that it is cheaper, and has less storage capacity"; 
— verbalization of an overall judgment (VJ.) for the first (VJ1) or second (VJ2) 
alternative, e.g., "this one is also rather poor" or "seems like a reasonable machine". 
— mentioning of a dimension, e.g., "graphics facilities don't matter", and 
— a rest category consisting of inferences, elaborations, etc. A unit was coded as 
belonging to only one of the categories. 
Table 4 shows the result of the scoring as percentage scores. 
Table 4: Percentage of four different verbalizations and a rest category for the first and 
secondly presented choice alternative 
f i r s t Second Total 
alternative alternative 
Single features (VSF) 43% 23% 70% 
Dimensional comparisons (VDC) - 11% 11% 
Overall judgments (VJ.) 7% 5% 12% 
Mentioning of dimensions 1% 1% 2% 
Rest category 1% 4% 5% 
Note: For the 120 choice trials, the total number of verbalizations was 870. 
There was a relatively high percentage of overall judgments (12%). Nearly half of the 
presented alternatives received an overall judgment (42.5% of the 240 alternatives 
presented). On the other hand, there was also a considerable amount of dimensional 
processing. Obviously, dimensional processing has to occur when the second alternative is 
presented. 
As postulated by criterion dependent choice models, the processing of features and 
dimensions was selective. Because the alternatives were rather similar, it is difficult to 
decide whether it was also adaptive to characteristics of alternatives or pairs of 
alternatives.2 Figure 1 shows the relative frequencies of verbalizations of single features on 
the first alternative, the second alternative, and for dimensional comparisons, as a function 
of the importance of the dimensions. As can be seen, some dimensions are hardly ever 
verbalized, and the clear majority of verbalizations occurs for the three most important 
dimensions. On average, only about three dimensions were processed for an alternative 
which reveals highly selective processing. 
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Figure 1: Percentage of different verbalizations as a function of the importance of 
dimensions 
Contingencies of verbalizations. The following analyses are based upon the 120 choice 
pairs. It can be seen from Table 5 which shows conditional frequencies whether or not 
there is a relation between the formation of an overall judgment and the occurrence of 
dimensional comparisons. It appears that the formation of an overall judgment for the first 
alternative does not influence the likelihood of dimensional comparisons, while the 
formation of a judgment for the second alternative leads to reduced application of 
dimensional comparisons. The (unconditional) relative frequency of at least one 
verbalization of a dimensional comparison was .48. 
2) For those choices where an overall judgment of the second alternative indicated judgment based 
processing (see description of hybrid decision strategy), alternatives were classified as extreme (i.e., very 
good or very bad), or medium. The average number of processed features was 2.1 and 2.7 for extreme and 
medium alternatives, respectively. For the other choice pairs where supposedly dimension based processing 
occured, pairs were classified as dissimilar or similar. The average number of processed features per choice 
pair was 6.0 and 6.1 for dissimilar and similar choice pairs, respectively. 
Table 5: Conditional relative frequencies of at least one dimensional comparison for a 
choice pair when there was: 
An overall judgment for the 1st alternative: .47 
No overall judgment for the 1st alternative: .50 
An overall judgment for the 2nd alternative: .33 
No overall judgment for the 2nd alternative: .56 
The conditional relative frequencies given in Table 6 show that if no overall judgment is 
derived for the first alternative, there most likely will not be an overall judgment of the 
second alternative either. The relative frequency of forming an overall judgment for the 
first presented alternative was .52, while the relative frequency of forming a judgment for 
the second alternative was .33. 
It is striking that the probability of the verbalization of a judgment for the first alternative 
(VJ1) is equal to the probability of verbalizing a judgment for the second alternative after a 
VJ1 had occurred. That is: 
P(VJ1) = P(VJ2|VJ1) = .52 (1) 
Table 6: Conditional relative frequency of an overall judgment for the secondly 
presented alternative when there was: 
An overall judgment for the 1st alternative: .52 
No overall judgment for the 1st alternative: .14 
A hybrid decision strategy 
The reported results were used to revise the previous processing assumptions for 
sequentially presented alternatives. 
Model assumptions. Subjects may use both alternative and dimension based processing. 
When presented with the first alternative, the subject processes the alternative's features 
and keeps them in short —term memory. With a certain probability a an overall judgment 
of the first alternative is formed and also stored in short-term memory. When the second 
alternative is presented, the decison maker may employ dimensional comparisons for 
deriving a choice in the way described at the beginning of the paper. In a dimensional 
comparison a feature stored in short-term memory is compared to the feature of the 
second alternative on the respective dimension. The dimensional comparison strategy is 
thus restricted to the set of dimensions for which features of the first alternative were held 
in short —term memory. 
If, in addition, an overall judgment of the first alternative has been held in short—term 
memory, the previously discussed judgment based strategy will be applied with probability 
a. 
The first steps of each of the two processing strategies may thus be performed together for 
a given pair whose alternatives are presented sequentially. Only after the second alternative 
is presented will either the judgment based or the dimension based strategy be applied. 
The described application of the two strategies may be stated more formally by a Markov 
model with four states: a start state (ST), the state of forming and storing an overall 
judgment of the first alternative in short —term memory (Jl), and the two absorbing states 
of applying the dimension based (DB) or the judgment based strategy (JB). Obviously, the 
process always begins in ST. The transition matrix is: 
ST 31 DB 3B 
ST 0 a 1-a 0 
J l 0 0 1-a a 
DB 0 0 1 0 
JB 0 0 0 1 
A n exploratory application. The subjects* verbalizations may indicate the state in which 
they are. Instead of using the subjects' choices to determine the parameter of the model we 
may thus use the reported verbalizations of overall judgments. Suppose that the formation 
of an overall judgment is verbalized with probability v. The probability of verbalizing a 
judgment on the first alternative would thus be 
P(VJ1) = a*v (2) 
The probability of verbalizing a judgment of the second alternative would be 
P(VJ2) = a2*v (3) 
The probability of verbalizing a judgment of the first and the second alternative of a pair is 
P ( V J 1 A V J 2 ) = (a*v)2 (4) 
From P(VJ1)=.52 and P(VJ2)=.33 the parameters are estimated to be a — .63 and v=.83. 
Because of the conditional independence expressed in Equation (1), these parameters also 
satisfy (4) . 
According to the exploratory model application, subjects would verbalize 83% of their 
judgments. For sequentially presented alternatives a dimension based strategy would be 
applied in 6 0 % (i.e., (1 — a) + a(l — a)) of the cases and a judgment based strategy in 4 0 % 
(i.e., a 2) of the cases. These percentages may explain why differences in the remembered 
overall judgments between simultaneously and sequentially presented alternatives were 
either small (Schmalhofer and Gertzen, 1986) or nonexistent (Experiment 1). 
Discussion 
The considerable number of verbalizations of dimensional comparisons clearly demonstrate 
that even for sequentially presented alternatives dimensional comparisons are performed. 
Table 5 shows that dimensional comparisons are more likely to occur when no overall 
judgment is verbalized for the second alternative. Thus dimensional comparisons do not 
occur at random but may indeed be a component of the subject's decision making process. 
With a similar argument we can derive that judgment based processing is a component of 
the subject's decision making process. 
Dimensional comparisons and overall judgments are consequently both component processes 
for deciding between sequentially presented alternatives whose application can be specified 
by a Markov model. For estimating the model parameter, only the verbalizations of overall 
judgments were used rather than including all verbalizations (e.g., VDCs). 
As seen from Table 5, the VDCs do not fit the model predictions as well. In particular, if 
no overall judgment is formed for the first alternative, the dimension based strategy should 
always be employed. Even if not all results of cognitive processing (judgments or 
comparisons) are verbalized, P(VDC|Not VJ1) should be considerably higher. Since this 
experiment was designed for exploration rather than testing a model, any assessment of its 
empirical validity should be left to appropriately designed experiments. 
General Discussion 
Tversky (1969) conjectured that choices between alternatives which are presented one after 
the other are derived by judgment based processing. Effort —quality analyses supposedly 
support this hypothesis. In testing the hypothesis, Schmalhofer and Gertzen (1986) showed 
that in comparison to simultaneously presented alternatives decision makers were indeed 
more likely to apply judgment based processing. However, they concluded that dimension 
based processing may occur as well, thus suggesting that things are not as simple as the 
original conjecture suggests. 
Experiment 1, which was basically a replication of their previous study supported this 
suggestion: Although the latencies indicated more judgment based processing for the 
sequential presentation than for the simultaneous presentation, the memory measures did 
not indicate any differences. 
Effort—quality analysis reconsidered. Effort-quality considerations do not unanimously 
support the conjecture: Although judgment based processing puts considerably lower 
demands on working memory, its computational effort is higher than the respective 
measures of dimension based processing (see Schmalhofer & Gertzen, 1986, Table 1). In 
performing the reported effort — quality analysis, the differences between the two strategies 
in memory effort were considered more crucial than the differences in computational 
effort. But whether this is true or not, really depends upon whether memory or processing 
resources are more scarce. If processing resources are scarce, dimension based processing 
should even be applied for sequentially presented alternatives. 
The judgment based strategy does not exhaust the capacity of working memory which is 
limited but constant. Thus available resources would remain unused. This is in contrast to 
the generally held assumption that the whole capacity of working memory is used and 
information is only lost by replacement (Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1968). A more reasonable 
assumption would therefore be that in addition to the overall judgment of the first 
alternative some of its features are also kept in working memory when the second 
alternative is presented. The stored features can be employed in dimensional comparisons 
with the respective features of the second alternative. This could yield choices based upon 
dimensional processing without excessive or any additional demands on working memory, 
while demanding less computational effort than judgment based processing. Dimension 
based as well as judgment based processing would thus be applied. 
In order to explore these processing components for sequentially available alternatives in 
more detail in the second experiment, a process—tracing method was employed for this 
presentation mode. Think aloud protocols showed that in addition to the judgment based 
processing, subjects indeed frequently employed dimension based processing. Since this 
requires the processing of the first alternative's features, they must have been stored in 
working memory. Spare memory capacity was thus utilized for storing features, allowing 
for dimension based processing. However this processing is restricted to a subset of 
dimensions which may obviously reduce choice quality. Depending on which features are 
lost choice quality decreases more or less strongly. Under such conditions it is therefore 
difficult to say whether alternative or dimension based processing should be applied when 
the second alternative is presented. 
The application of a Markov model indicated that 60% of the choices were derived by 
dimension based processing and 40% by judgment based processing. This is approximately 
consistent with the result that for 48% of the choice pairs at least one verbalization of a 
dimensional comparison was observed. In agreement with the model, the verbalizations also 
showed that the decision makers used a hybrid strategy consisting of judgment and 
dimensional comparison components. An exploratory study thus yielded a plausible model 
which deserves to be tested by future experiments. 
Contrary to Experiment 1, only sequentially presented alternatives were investigated by a 
process —tracing method (think aloud) in Experiment 2. By no means does the study imply 
that a hybrid strategy would also be used for simultaneously presented alternatives. For this 
presentation mode all features are externally available at once, so that dimensional 
processing requires less computational as well as memory resources than judgment based 
processing. The study by Schmalhofer and Schafer, in which think aloud data were 
collected for similar and simultaneously presented alternatives, yielded 35.5% verbalizations 
of dimensional comparisons (VDC), but only 2.9% verbalizations of judgments of 
alternatives (VJ.). Dimensional processing thus seems to be predominant for simultaneously 
presented alternatives. 
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